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Sovereign Debt Renegotiation Under Asymmetric Information 
Abstract 
This paper analyzes equilibrium debt contracts under potential 
renegotiation in the presence of sovereign risk. A simple model of 
borrowing from abroad to smooth consumption with stochastic national income 
is studied. Borrowers can choose to repudiate their debt obligations but 
face sanctions for doing so. Under free entry in loan contracts, 
equilibrium debt renegotiations take the form of reductions in current 
debt-service obligations with a new equilibrium market debt-contract. 
Under symmetric information, net inflows of funds are never provided in a 
renegotiation to a recalcitrant debtor. This contradicts part of the 
rationale given by several authors for a strategy of "defensive lending" to 
problem debtors. Asymmetric information about some debtor characteristic 
is introduced, and renegotiation of existing debt-service obligations is 
shown to give rise to separating equilibria. Because of the presence of 
private information, new net inflows may occur along with significant 
increases in future debt obligations in the event of renegotiation. The 
implications of these results for the dynamics of debt-service obligations 
and several extensions of the simple model are discussed. 
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Sovereign Debt Renegotiation Under Asymmetric Information 
Kenneth M. Kletzer 
This paper presents a theoretical analysis of the negotiation of the 
terms of contracts between private lenders and sovereign debtors. Credit 
market equilibrium when debt contracts are subject to renegotiation is studied 
in a framework which emphasizes the ability of a sovereign to repudiate its 
debt obligations. Our objective is to examine the consequences of contract 
renegotiation for new capital inflows to a country and the growth of its 
external debt burden. Some of the results suggest that private negotiations 
lead to socially inefficient outcomes. 
Several authors have discussed the potential of new loans to problem 
debtor nations for increasing the present value of existing external debt. 
Two issues need to be distinguished. The first of these, which is addressed 
in this paper, is the hypothesis that additional funds provided to a currently 
recalcitrant sovereign debtor form part of an optimal strategy for creditors 
as a whole. Cline (1983), Krugman (1985, 1987), Sachs (1984), and others 
argue that additional funds reduce the probability of default on outstanding 
debt. Cline, in particular, merely assumes that new loans reduce the 
likelihood of default, so that additional loans which taken by themselves 
achieve negative expected profits provide the benefit of raising total 
expected repayments of outstanding debt. Therefore, the total return on the 
incremental loans to all creditors exceeds their opportunity cost. The second 
issue is that private lenders do not provide additional funds which increase 
the expected present value of all existing debt because existing creditors may 
be unable to internalize all the benefits due to the public-goods aspect of 
the new loans. 
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The characteristics of equilibriwn loan contracts subject to subsequent 
renegotiation are discussed in a simple model of borrowing from abroad to 
smooth conswnption when national income is stochastic, following the approach 
of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). Borrowers have the ability to repudiate their 
obligations, but face sanctions for doing so. Lenders are asswned to be risk 
neutral and there is free entry in loan contracts, so that new creditors will 
provide any debt contract which assures them non-negative expected profits 
given existing debt service obligations. When a debtor suffers a low income 
state, repudiation with consequent penalization can be superior to meeting 
debt service obligations as originally contracted and choosing a new debt 
contract that provides zero expected profits to lenders. 
In this case, existing creditors have an incentive to reduce the 
repayment obligations and refrain from declaring a default. A breach of 
contract does not automatically lead to declaration of default, because this 
is a subsequent option available to creditors and need not be exercised. 
Equilibriwn contract renegotiations are first examined for the case in 
which the debtor's current state is common knowledge. Optimal second-best 
renegotiations for the creditor in the presence of free entry in new debt 
contracts are shown to result in a reduction in existing debt service with no 
concurrent net inflow of funds to debtors. Furthermore, simple relending of 
funds to cover existing debt service payments in order to obtain an option on 
even larger future repayments is not, in general, optimal behavior for a 
creditor. The rationality for lenders of such "defensive" lending and debt 
reschedulings (suggested, for example, by Cline (1983) and Krugman (1985 and 
1987) is put into question by these results. The first section of this paper 
shows that when debtor prefers the penalties that accompany repudiation to 
"repaying its current debt and taking a new loan "contract that assures 
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non-negative expected profits to a new lender, then the old creditors' best 
actions are equivalent to reducing current debt service payments followed by a 
new market debt contract. Lindert (1986) makes a similar argument in a model 
without·repayment renegotiations, in which the debtor can choose only full 
repayment or repudiation. 
The section concludes by comparing debt contracts with subsequent 
renegotiation to equilibrium complete state-contingent loan contracts, 
constrained by the possibility of repudiation. Under free entry, ex post 
renegotiation of standard debt contracts does not lead to the same outcome as 
lending with ex ante specification of state-contingent repayment schedules. 
The next section of the paper introduces asymmetric information about the 
debtor's state; this motivates the use of debt contracts in place of state 
contingent claims. Equilibrium renegotiations in this extension of the simple 
model of sovereign borrowing may entail debt reschedulings and new capital 
inflows in order to satisfy a set of incentive compatibility constraints. 
These alternatives to debt write-downs will separate borrowers according to 
their current state, which is not observable directly by creditors. By 
inducing self-selection by borrowers, equilibrium debt renegotiation offers 
induce revelation of the debtor's private information. The introduction of 
private information qualifies the argument made in the perfect information 
model, but for very different reasons than those given by proponents of 
defensive lending. Debt-,:-enegotiation in this model leads to a dynamic 
behavior of net capital flows and debt-service obligations that may be of some 
interest. Poor states of the world for debtors lead to large increases in 
debt burdens although the net inflow of capital is negative or small. The 
marginal rate of interest for rescheduled debt can become very large as a 
consequence of the asymmetry in information. 
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A natural extension of the analysis of these two sections is the 
introduction of bilateral bargaining ex post, to give debtors more market 
power than simply access to new lenders. The adoption of the noncooperative 
strategic approach to the Nash bargaining problem in the complete and perfect 
information model will not affect qualitatively the outcomes of debt 
renegotiation. Under incomplete information about debtor characteristics, 
separation of different types of borrowers occurs through strategic delay 
rather than choice over a number of simultaneous offers made by creditors. 
The third section presents an approach to extending the analysis under 
asymmetric information to, a strategic Nash bargaining framework. Both 
separating and pooling equilibria are possible outcomes. The model outlined 
includes capital accumulation, so that depreciation of the per capita physical 
capital stock is part of the social cost of delaying agreement in debt 
renegotiations. 
The fourth section briefly summarizes a multi-period contracting approach 
when the debtor has sovereign immunity and lenders can credibly enter into 
contractual obligations binding on them which are enforceable in creditor 
nation courts. An application of such contracts, which incorporate, 
explicitly or implicitly, the possibility of revision, is the self-enforcement 
of restrictions on debt-dilution and provisions for debt-seniority. Contracts 
providing access to future loans on favorable terms provide an incentive for 
performance contingent on future events; repayment terms for early periods 
compensate lenders for the expected loss on these future contract options. 
An alternative to the two extreme information assumptions is also 
discussed. A more realistic assumption may be that the debtor's current state 
is observable by creditors, but that policies (for example, those affecting 
investment levels) chosen by debtors are unobserved by lenders. In this case, 
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the pattern of capital flows over time induces debtors to choose certain 
policies, but contracts cannot be written or renegotiated contingent upon the 
choice of policy. Capital flows can, at best, depend only on the history of 
borrower income in a stochastic model. The principal-agent approach to the 
repeated moral hazard problem can be extended to the sovereign borrowing case 
under a number of restrictive assumptions to yield a characterization of 
constrained optimal capital flows contingent on income. With the violation of 
the validity of a major assumption a distinct possibility arises that a 
complementarity between the collective actions of lenders and borrower policy 
choices can lead to inferior outcomes. This is especially likely when the 
policy instruments available for transfering resources from the private sector 
to the government for debt service are distortionary. Equilibria can exist 
that involve periods of large capital outflows requiring policies creating 
significant deadweight losses. At the margin, no additional loan will achieve 
non-negative profits. However the burden of distortionary policy can lead to 
a fundamental non-convexity. A large reduction in the current trade surplus 
may lead to an adequate shift in the marginal productivity of new loans to 
support the lower current debt service requirement. Since this requires 
lending by creditors with concurrent domestic policy revision by debtors, 
coordination can be a significant problem. 
The last section offers concluding remarks and discusses implications of 
the asymmetric information case for the dynamics of debt service obligations. 
These suggest a significant social inefficiency reflected in the onset of 
repayment difficulties. 
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I. Debt Renegotiation in a Principal-Agent Model 
This section discusses the renegotiation of debt service obligations in a 
version of the familiar Eaton-Gersovitz (1981) model. The sovereign debtor 
always has the option to repudiate its obligations outright and suffer 
consequent sanctions. The reduction in social welfare for the debtor country 
that sanctions can cause is limited, so that the borrower has limited 
liability for debt obligations. We assume that the threat of penalization for 
repudiation is credible and that creditors receive nothing by imposing 
sanctions. The behavior of the borrower is derived by maximizing a discounted 
stream of felicity of current consumption subject to a set of constraints. 
This represents a decision maker's social welfare function. A single good is 
produced and consumed. For simplicity, we ignore investment, so that output 
is an exogenous random variable. Under the informational assumptions of this 
section and the next, investment plays no essential qualitative role. 
If the debtor chooses to repudiate, it receives a level of utility, V, 
which depends on the current realization of output, y, and possibly on the 
value of the outstanding debt service obligations, R. That is, the 
repudiation level of utility depends on the debtor's current state, (y,R). 
The borrower's felicity function, U(c), is concave, displays positive marginal 
felicity of current consumption, c, and is continuous. In equilibrium, the 
borrower will face a set of debt-contract offers in the event it chooses to 
pay current debt service and another set of offers if it seeks to renegotiate 
current contractual obligations. Because we assume a stationary environment 
(output is identically and independently distributed each period), the 
borrower can always select the same debt contract each period by paying the 
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interest obligation on the constant principal every period. Since the 
realized level of output is observed before current consumption and the new 
loan is chosen, the borrower will select different contracts (or repudiation), 
including a possible request to renegotiate, depending upon the current state, 
(y,R). 
An important assumption is that there is free entry in debt contracts 
any expected profitable contract will be offered by a pool of potential 
lenders. If a loan providing non-negative expected profits will be accepted 
by a borrower, then it will be offered by some creditor. When a debtor 
prefers repudiation to repayment and selection of a new debt contract from 
this pool of potential lenders, existing creditors have an incentive to offer 
combinations of net current payments and new debt service obligations that 
cannot be obtained from the market. We model such renegotiations in a setting 
in which current creditors make offers to their debtors who choose to accept 
or reject these offers, but do not make counteroffers. This corresponds to a 
principal-agent setting in which the market power of existing creditors is 
limited by the potential entry of new creditors. 
The utility maximization problem for debtors is first described. This 
provides constraints for the creditor's maximization problem. A debt contract 
is a pair (it' R ), where i is the principal provided at time t and R ist+1 t t+1 
the total debt service obligation due at time t+l, or, equivalently, the time 
t+l present value of the contracted repayment obligations. 
In the event of full repayment, the borrower's value is given by: 
(1) 




subject to (it, Rt+l) ES, 
where the set Sis independent of (yt' Rt). The expectation is taken with 
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respect to Yt+l; V(·, ·) will be defined below. The set Sis the·equilibrium 
set of debt contracts providing non-negative expected profits. The 
difference, (it - Rt), is the net inflow of funds at time t. The discount 
factor,~, is between O and 1. 
Let the debtor's repudiation value under limited liability be given by 
V(yt,Rt) which is increasing in yt and non-increasing in Rt. In the event of 
renegotiation, the debtor will choose a contract from a set of debt contracts 
that depend on the information available to creditors. We assume that this 
always includes R and discuss the case in which y is common knowledge in 
t t 
this section. In the next section, it is debtor private information. 
re 
Define: 
(yt,Rt) = max [U(yt +it-Rt)+ ~EV(yt+l' Rt+l)], (2) 
subject to (it,Rt+l) E S(yt' Rt). 
This latter set contains Sand will include additional contracts if Vr(y ,R)t t 
is less than V(yt,Rt). The value of the debtor's optimal program is just 
V(yt' Rt)= max (il°e(yt' Rt)' V(yt,Rt)), (3) 
since il°e(yt,Rt) is at least as great as il°(yt,Rt). 
The distribution for output is assumed to have compact support. The 
expectation of Vis taken with respect toy t. We 
use the shorter notation 
EV(R) for the remainder. 
Creditors are assumed to be risk neutral (therefore, expected profit 
maximizers) and face an opportunity cost of loans given by a discount factor, 
p. A one-period debt contract provides expected profits given by 
(4) 
where the expectation, taken with respect to the distribution of output, is of 
the actual period t+l present value of debt service payments conditional on 
the contractual obligation, R 1 .t+ 
9 
The legal status of existing debt service obligations within or between 
creditor nations will be crucial for determining the set of offered contracts. 
For example, while loan covenants binding on debtor behavior may not be 
credibly enforceable, seniority provisions binding on subsequent lenders may 
be enforceable in creditor nation courts. A senior creditor may be able to 
recover fully any payments made to successor lenders in its home country up to 
its contractual claim. On the other hand, if all claims have equal priority, 
creditors will share according to some proportions in actual settlements. 
Suppose that the variable x denotes the surplus available for meeting 
debt service in an equilibrium settlement of obligations and that xis 
distributed according to the cumulative distribution function F(x). This 
distribution depends upon the distribution of y and is conditional on R, in 
the general case. With strict seniority, the senior creditor obtains expected 
profits 
Err(i,R) = -i + p [ Ii xdF(x) +RI~ dF(x) ], (5) 
where His the maximum total settlement possible. 
A second creditor will obtain 
- - IR -IHErr(i, R; R) = -i + p [ R (x-R)dF(x) + R R dF] 
with contract (I, R) given prior commitments R. In such an instance, the set 
of new debt contracts available to a borrower will be identical for any number 
of concurrent loans taken. The debtor can do no better than to accept a zero 
expected profit contract from a single source. 
If lenders share in payments according to the portion of their claims in 
total claims, then each lender attains expected profits 
I R 
IHErr(i. ,R. ;R) -i + p [(Ri/R) Ox dF(x) + Ri R dF(x) ],
.L .L 
where R = ~ R .. 
i .L 
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In this case, in an equilibrium debt contract, each lender correctly 
anticipates subsequent contract offers so that expected profits for every 
creditor are non-negative. The set of total' debt contracts that attain 
non-negative expected profits is the same whenever obligations to new lenders 
do not take precedence over existing debt, since the conditional distribution. 
of xis unaffected. However, the equilibrium ·debt contract will not be the 
same. Under strict seniority, the choice of contract made in equation (1) 
will be the best zero-expected profit contract for the debtor (equivalent to 
the Nash equilibrium contract under observability defined in Kletzer (1984)). 
In the absence of seniority provisions (for example, the neutral case above), 
the equilibrium contract will be an interest-rate taking zero-profit contract, 
as defined in Kletzer (1984) (equivalently, in Gale and Hellwig (1985)). This 
type of contract is socially inefficient, in that it is dominated for the 
debtor by the strict seniority outcome. For now, we assume that seniority 
provisions enforceable between creditors in their home courts are credible. 
The initial description of equilibrium debt renegotiations in this 
standard approach will be made assuming that the debtor always has the option 
to pay contractual debt service and select a new debt contract that will 
realize a non-negative expected profit. However, a new debt contract may not 
be offered if existing obligations are not met, because new creditors' claims 
are junior to existing claims. If new funds are offered when old debts are 
not being serviced, in the absence of a negotiated settlement, the debt 
service obligations on these new funds are at least as great as they would be 
for incremental funds taken in addition to the original contract (that is, the 
additional debt service that would be incurred.to obtain a larger original 
contract). The additional debt service obligations will be even greater if 
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the old creditors can claim additional interest from payments made to the new 
suppliers. 
Free entry in debt contracts and the limited liability of debtors impose 
limitations on the outcomes attainable by creditors in debt service 
renegotiations. Constrained contract renegotiations for the lender can be 
described using a principal-agent framework in which the creditor offers 
contract revisions to the debtor. We first assume that the borrowers' current 
output, y, is common knowledge (throughout, we assume that the debtor's 
utility function is common knowledge). In this setting, a first-best contract 
may not be a standard debt contract with ex post renegotiation of debt service 
because additional risk sharing may be provided by state-contingent contracts. 
We first discuss renegotiation of debt contracts because this corresponds more 
closely to the framework in which the case for defensive lending has been 
argued. The structure of equilibrium state-contingent contracts in this 
approach is discussed at the end of this section. 
Because the equilibrium set of debt contracts offered will be bounded 
from above in 1, there exist states such that the borrower prefers repudiation 
to full repayment. These states can be shown to occur with positive 
probability. Because creditors lose the entire opportunity cost of their 
loans in a repudiation, any settlement that provides some current repayment or 
net expected future payment will be preferred by the creditor. The borrower's 
alternative of choosing a zero-expected profit contract (but junior claim) 
from another lender without repaying will, at the worst, result in a loss to 
the current creditors of the opportunity interest on the maximum settlement 
they would obtain in the current state. If we assume, for simplicity, that no 
additional interest is attainable, then the debtor prefers to repudiate if 
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V(y,R) > max(max (U(y + I) + f3EV (R + R)), Vr (y,R)}, (6) 
(I,R+R)ES 
Modification for imperfectly enforceable seniority clauses or enforceable 
contracts specifying overdue interest charges is straightforward. 
Whenever (6) obtains, creditors will select contracts that provide the 
debtor with utility at least equal to the repudiation level. These offers 
will depend only on the debtor's current state. If we make the simplification 
that V(y,R) = V(y), then the equilibrium expected profits for debt contracts 
is given by (5), where F(x) depends on the level of debt service obligations 
and the distribution of y. The set Sis given by 
S = { (i,R) I Err (i,R) > 0} 
When only the lender makes offers that the debtor accepts or rejects (in the 
presense of free entry of new creditors under our seniority assumption), the 
equilibrium renegotiated offers satisfy 
(7) 
with respect to i(yt), R(yt) 
s.t. V (yt) ~ U( yt + i(yt) - R) + /3EV(R(yt)). 
Note that any solution cannot be contained in S since (6) holds. The solution 
to this problem is identical to the solution to the problem: 
max R 
s.t. V(yt) ~ max [ U(yt + i' - R) + /3EV(R') ], 
with respect to (i', R') ES 
The profit-maximizing lender will never choose to make an offer of a net flow 
of funds to or from a debtor that involves an incremental loan providing 
negative expected profits. Any creditor-optimal renegotiation is equivalent 
to a simple reduction in current debt service (in expected present value 
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terms) plus a new loan attainable from any potential entrant. The creditor 
should be indifferent between offering a current net payment with a new debt 
service obligation and offering a reduction in the current debt service just 
enough that a new creditor will take over the debt and the borrower will not 
choose to repudiate. Because the debtor always has the option to repudiate, 
the expected value of continuation in (1)-(3) must be at least as great as the 
expected value under repudiation. Therefore, whenever (6) obtains, 
contractual performance must require a net outflow of output from the debtor. 
A solution to problem (7) never entails a new inflow of funds to the borrower. 
A common .argument (for example, Krugman (1985)) is that the relending of 
contractual debt service obligations when a debtor is unwilling to meet them 
currently is a preferred action for lenders because the option on higher 
future payments is obtained at no cost in new capital. The above discussion 
lends considerable doubt to this common sense proposition. Relending old debt 
service with interest and a zero current net flow of funds is not generally 
the optimal ex post contract for the creditor. The maximum expected present 
value of a renegotiated contract is attained by reducing debt obligations by 
just enough so that the debtor can achieve its repudiation level of utility by 
selecting its optimal new zero-expected profit debt contract. This debtor 
action (or its equivalent, in which current creditors are also the new 
providers of the zero-expected profit loan) extracts all the debtor's surplus; 
therefore, no other contract renegotiation is superior for the current 
creditors. The option on new debt repayments under the rollover scheme has a 
positive opportunity cost; starting at the creditor-optimal revised contract 
devised above, a negative expected profit loan must be made implicitly to 
provide the rescheduled loan that gives the debtor utility equal to its 
repudiation utility. 
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Figure 1 depicts the set of new debt contracts, S, and indifference 
curves for the debtor for the more general case of the repudiation utility 
depending on bothy and R. The horizontal axis measures the net inflow of 
resources to the debtor. The set Sis not bounded from above in contractual 
obligations in the presence of equilibrium renegotiations. The maximum 
expected present value of a renegotiation attainable by creditors can be seen 
to be the greatest value of -R such that the set S intersects the repudiation 
indifference curve. 
Because the debtor has limited liability for debt obligations in this 
framework, the utility attained with a current zero net flow of resources is 
always at least as great as the level of utility received by repudiating. 
Therefore, no new flows from lenders are required to avoid repudiation. 
The presence of debt service obligations as a state variable introduces a 
simple history dependence in the expected utility of debtors and the 
renegotiation offers made available. Past realizations of income affect 
current choices of debtors and, in the event of renegotiation, existing 
creditors. In this simple Markov model, however, the set of new debt 
contracts, S, is unaffected. In equilibrium, only partial risk sharing 
between risk-neutral lenders and risk-averse borrowers is achieved through 
debt contracts with renegotiation. This occurs because creditors are limited 
in their abilities to obtain large payments in the best income states of 
nature. 
An alternative approach to the problem of lending with potential 
repudiation under complete and perfect information is to derive the first-best 
type of contract (constrained by the threat of repudiation) that will be state 
contingent. The problem of characterizing such contracts in our setting can 











that the future utility of the debtor will be determined completely by the 
difference between income and debt service obligations, (y -R(y )),
t+1 t+1 
since repudiation will never occur (if creditors receive nothing in that 
event). 
The first-best problem with free entry in loan contracts is given by 
(assuming Vis only a function of y): 
with respect to it and R(yt+l), 
subject to V(y t+l - R(yt+l)) ~ V(y t+l), for each y t+l 
and -it+ pE(R(yt+l)) = 0. 
The solution to this problem is straightforward and entails constant 
consumption for a subset of the output states, if p equals~- The states for 
which utility may be held to the repudiation level will be the high output 
states, not the low ones. Consumption is imperfectly smoothed if repudiation 
is superior in some (high output) state to consumption of mean output. This 
contrasts sharply with the second-best renegotiation case. If p exceeds~ 
(the borrower is more impatient than the lender), then a sequence of 
one-period loan contracts may smooth income for early periods, but after the 
repudiation constraint becomes binding in the best output state, consumption 
will continue to decline and will not be smoothed thereafter in the framework 
used above. Worrall (1987) adopts a trigger-strategy penalty mechanism for 
competitive lenders and shows that long-run consumption smoothing can result. 
In the perfect information setting, first-best contracts are fully state 
contingent. Such contracts cannot be replicated by simple debt contracts with 
ex post renegotiation in the presence of free entry of new creditors. The 
latter type of contracts may arise as first-best outcomes when debtors' 
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current states are observable by creditors only at a cost (for example, see 
Gale and Hellwig (1985)). 
II. Private Information and Separating Equilibria 
In this section, debtors are assumed to possess private information about 
the utility they receive by accepting various debt contracts. Therefore they. 
have an incentive to report incorrectly their willingness to repudiate to 
obtain a reduction in debt service payments. Whenever lenders perceive a 
positive probability, given current debt obligations, that a borrower would 
prefer repudiation to the selection of a new debt contract with repayment, the 
borrower may be able to misrepresent its private information. If creditors 
are unable to observe the realized value of output, under the equilibrium 
renegotiation scheme of the previous section in every output state the debtor 
will claim willingness to repudiate. Some contract with debt service 
reduction chosen in a low output state will be preferred in a high output 
state to repayment. Creditors will seek to design the offers they make in 
debt renegotiations to induce correct revelation of the private information. 
Lenders will want to offer debt renegotiation packages which will be chosen 
over repudiation in poor events but which are inferior to repayment in 
favorable outcomes. 
The private information possessed by debtors can be anything that affects 
the social welfare attained by choosing different debt contracts. For 
example, national leadership may be better informed about factors determining 
the social costs of achieving given levels of trade surplus than are foreign 
creditors. For expositional simplicity, let the realized value of output be 
unobservable by creditors, although we intend it to be a proxy for some 
measure of debtor country surplus. The distribution of output is assumed to 
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be common knowledge, as are all other characteristics of the borrower. Also, 
suppose that output, y, can only take a finite number of values with positive 
probability. These are given by y1 , y2 , ... ,y in increasing o
rder. The 
n 
random variable, y, can be thought of as parameterizing a class of utility 
functions for the national leadership. Creditors do not know what type of 
decision-maker they face at each date. Each period a new type is drawn from 
the common distribution. In this interpretation, the period length is the 
time a particular type is in power. Again, the identification of y with 
output is not intended to be literal. 
The creditors' problem is to choose a set of contracts to offer in the 
event of renegotiation requests such that their ex ante expected profit is 
maximized, when debtors ex post maximize utility over the set of contracts 
(including renegotiation packages) available. A contract renegotiation will 
be chosen only if it is the maximal contract in the realized state over the 
set of contracts offered for all states. The creditor's inability to observe 
output implies that debtor self-selection alone must be relied upon to assure 
the anticipated behavior in each output state. The creditor's problem is to 
design a contract set that induces truthful revelation. The equilibrium set 
of renegotiations offered will separate different output realizations through 
contract choice, so that ex post the private information is revealed. 
The set of equilibrium offers under free entry in ex ante contracts, 
debtor-creditor relationships) and debtor limited liability is characterized 
again using a principal-agent framework. Because simple reductions in debt 
service will be chosen by the borrower in either low or high output states, 
offered revisions of debt repayments under asymmetric information about output 
realizations must observe a self-selection constraint. The contracts offered 
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to assure non-'repudiation in low output states must be inferior to other 
contracts available when the debtor realizes high output value. The addition 
of constraints assuring correct contract selection leads to a separating 
equilibrium. There will be n contracts available, with a different contract 
selected in each output realization. The contract intended to be selected in 
a particular state will provide the maximum utility to the debtor in that 
state over the set of offers. Some of these contracts will simply be the best 
choices over the set of new debt contracts available from any potential 
creditor. That is, the set of ex ante debt contracts will always be available 
with repayment of contractual debt service. 
The set of ex ante debt contracts (those available from any new entrant 
creditor following repayment) will be found by first characterizing the set of 
ex post repayment revisions offered in equilibrium for a given current debt 
service obligation, R. Each member of the set of debt contracts offered by 
the current creditor will consist of a current net payment and a debt service 
obligation for the next period. These contracts will not be equivalent to the 
debt reductions derived in the previous section. Imposition of the 
self-selection contraints is found to result in lower ex post profit in each 
state than could be attained if the value of output were observed directly by 
the creditor. The equilibrium set of contracts involve higher levels of debt 
service for the next period for low output realizations than would arise with 
symmetric information. 
The set of ex ante offers is derived using the solution to the creditor's 
ex post problem, as a perfect equilibrium. The set of initial non-negative 
expected profit contracts offered is a subset of what it would be without 
private information. Lenders are assured non-negative expected profits ex 
ante, so that ex ante debtor ..utility is. lower than under symmetric 
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information. In most states, however, debtors are better off ex post than if 
they could then report their output state before revised repayment offers are 
made. In states for which repudiation provides higher utility than full 
repayment, the debtor can receive higher utility under debt renegotiation than 
the repudiation level. Since under symmetric information, the debtor is 
always forced to either its repudiation utility level or its maximal utility 
over the set of new contracts with repayment (whichever is larger), direct 
reporting of the value of output before the choice of a contract ex post is 
incredible. Direct revelation only occurs with the selection of a separating 
equilibrium .contract revision. 
Given a level of existing debt service obligations, R, the existing 
creditor's problem is to find contracts, (i., R.), for each i, to maximize 
1. 1. 
expected profits. The set of zero expected profit debt contracts, S, will be 
found implicitly; however, we assume that it is non-empty and define a loan 
offer, i', for each next period debt service obligation, R .. That is, i' (R.)
1. 1. 
is the size loan which repayment obligation R. equals in expected present
1. 
value for creditors. The present value loss to a creditor from offering the 
contract 
01.., R.), is (i. - i' (R.)).
1. 1. 1. 
The existing creditor's problem is given by 
n 
(8)max Z: p.(i'.(R.) - i.)
1. 1. 1. 1.
i=l 
with respect to ((i.,R.)} for i=l, . . ,n, subject to, for all i, 
1. 1. 
(a) U(y. + i. - R) + f3EV(R.) ~ V(y., R) 




(c) U(y. + ,e_ -R) + f3EV(R.) ~ U(y. + ,e_ -R) + f3EV(R.), 
.1 .1 .1 .1 J J 
for all j ~ i. 
The probability of output yi being realized is pi. Constraint (a) is the 
restriction that repudiation is inferior to the debt contract offered for each 
value y., and (b) is the restriction on offers created by free entry in new 
.1 
contracts. The third is the self-selection constraint. The contract (,£., R.)
.1 .1 
is at least as good for the de.btor in state i as every other offer. We assume 
that indifference for the debtor is resolved in the lender's favor to assure a 
solution. 
The solution to this problem yields a set of n offers ex post such that 
debt repudiation never occurs. The contracts offered to the debtor which are 
taken in some states for which repudiation is superior to repayment on 
contracted terms can provide greater utility than outright repudiation. 
Likewise, in some states for which selection of a new ex ante debt contract 
(with full repayment) is preferred to repudiation, the debtor will attain even 
higher utility by taking a contract offered by the current creditor but not by 
new entrants. The self-selection constraints produce these possibilities by 
creating trade-offs between expected profit in different states. The 
equilibrium contracts are interrelated. 
The following proposition summarizes the properties of the equilibrium 
set of debt renegotiations. Define V(x., R.) ""'U(y. + ,e_ -R) + f3EV(R.),
.1 .1 .1 .1 .1 
where x. = ..e.-R . 
.1 .1 
Proposition: Given current debt service obligations, the lender's most 
preferred debt renegotiations satisfy: 
a) x. and R. are both non-increasing in i . 
.1 .1 
b) V. (x. ,R.) is non-<lecreasing in i . 
.1 .1 .1 
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(An analogous condition may hold for additional i) 
d) -Whenever V. (x. ,R .) > max{V(y. ,R),





.L .L .L 
V.(x. ,R. )
.L .L- 1 .L- 1
holds . 
e) If V.(x.,R.)









+ R, and 
(,Q.,R.)
J J 
ES, for allj >i, so that V.(x.,R.) =r(y., R),
J J J J 
also. 
The proof of this proposition and additional hypotheses are contained in the 
appendix. Sappington (1983) presents similar results to part of the above for 
a. simpler limited liability principal-agent problem. 
In equilibrium, utility is nondecreasing and the net payment by the 
debtor is nondecreasing in output, while the next period debt service 
obligation is nonincreasing in output. The set of debt renegotiations offered 
forces the debtor in the lowest output state, if repudiation is ever preferred 
to repayment, to its repudiation level of utility. This may also be true for 
higher states. 
The debtor may choose contracts from the ex ante zero expected profit set 
(contracts new entrants offer) in some high output states. The equilibrium ex 
post contract in these states may provide even higher utility. If the debtor 
attains just Vr(y.,R) in state y., then the existing creditor just offers the 
.L .L 
same set of debt contracts which any new entrant will offer, S. If the 
solution to the creditor's problem has the debtor choose repayment and a new 
zero expected profit contract in a state j, then the equilibrium choice in all 
higher states is also repayment as contracted. Result (d) states that the 
debtor is indifferent between the equilibrium debt contract for the realized 
state under renegotiation and the contract offered for the next lowest state, 
except, possibly, in two situations. The first occurs·when the current state 
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renegotiated debt contract provides just the repudiation level of utility for 
that state. The second occurs when the contract chosen in equilibrium 
involves full repayment for the present realization of output. 
The continuous-state indifference property of result (d) and the above 




R. ), expected present value for the creditor in the next highest state can 
i- 1 
always be increased if the debtor's utility can be reduced in this next 
highest state. Therefore, unless utility cannot be reduced further in state 
i, the debtor is indifferent between the debt renegotiations for that state 
and for the next lower state. When the debtor achieves exactly the 
repudiation level of utility or the level assured by free entry in new debt 
contracts, this indifference may or may not hold. If the debtor chooses a new 
debt contract with full repayment in both the present state and next lower 
state, under concavity of felicity, this property does not hold. 
Figure 2 shows a separating equilibrium set of debt renegotiations. The 
intertemporal marginal rate of substitution portrayed decreases with y for a 
given contract because U(c) is strictly concave. Concavity is important for 
demonstrating the proposition; however, concavity of U(c) does not imply that 
the derived indifference curves are convex everywhere. The relationship 
between expected value and contractual debt service obligations depends on the 
entire set of equilibrium debt contracts. The indifference curves are drawn 
smooth in Figure 2 for simplicity; with a finite number of states, they will 
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Figure 2 
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The equilibril.lIIl ex post contracts display a simple relationship between 
the intertemporal rate of substitution in contract terms along the boundary of 
S (zero expected profit contracts) and the intertemporal marginal rate of 
substitution. These are equal if full repayment occurs in equilibrium. If 
24 
the debtor in state i is assigned contract (x.,R.), then the slope of the1. 1. 
boundary of Sat the contract (i' (R.),R.) equals the intertemporal rate of1. 1. 
substitution if the debtor is not indifferent in state i+l between this 
contract and (xi+l'Ri+l). In the case of continuous state indifference, the 
rate of contract substitution equals a weighted swn of the marginal rate of 
substitution in state i and in state i+l. The weight on the state i+l 
marginal rate of substitution is negative, but smaller in absolute value than 
the weight on the state irate of substitution. This reflects the trade-off 
to ex post expected profit between lowering state i profit by revising R. and1. 
x. and increas.ing...&tate i+l profit by reducing utility in state i+l (lowering
1. 
x. ). The marginal rate of substitution of R. for x. in state i is less than 
1.+1 1. 1. 
the intertemporal rate of contract substitution. Therefore, state i profit 
alone is not maximized. The weights are implicitly given in the proof of th~ 
proposition; they depend upon the probability distribution of output and the 
marginal felicity of conswnption in the two states. 
Derivation of the set of initial loan contracts, S, remains. The ex ante 
expected profit is given by 
n 
E1r -i + p [R + I: p.(i' (R.) - i.)],1. 1. 1.
i=l 
where (i.,R.) are solutions to the creditor's ex post optimization problem.
1. 1. 
The last term (summand) is the expected present value of the reduction in debt 
service received. Even if£. exceeds£' (R.), the lender's return may exceed 1. 1. 
opportunity cost in some states. Maximization of expected profit will lead to 
a non~ero probability that the debtor is willing to repudiate. Risk 
neutrality of creditors allows risk-averse debtors to achieve some degree of 
insurance. As in the well-known principal-agent literature (for example, 
Holmstrom (1979), Harris and Raviv (1979)), risk sharing is incomplete due to 
25 
the need for equilibrium debt renegotiation to observe the self-selection 
constraints. Maximization of ex ante expected profit gives the set of 
non-negative expected profit contracts offered by new entrants. We assume 
that the utility function for the debtor, possible output states, and lender's 
discount factor are adequate to assure that the set is non-empty and potential 
debtors choose to borrow initially. 
An important consequence of the proposition is that the maximal ex ante 
contractual debt service obligation is at least as great as the resulting ex 
post debt service for the succeeding period in the lowest output state. Any 
increase in debt obligations beyond this level will never be met. A corollary 
to the proposition is that this level of debt obligations is the maximum 
amount such that ex post, the debtor repays in full and selects a new zero 
expected profit contract in the highest output state. Figure 3 portrays this 
equilibrium. The indifference curves are vertical beyond R1 
, as increases in 
R. have no effect on the debtor because such incremental repayment obligations 
1. 
are never repaid. 
In a separating equilibrium, the net capital outflow from the debtor can 
be either positive or negative in a state for which repudiation dominates full 
repayment of existing debt service and choice of a new ex ante debt contract. 
This contrasts with the equilibrium outcome under symmetric information. The 
possibility that the lender provides additional inflows to a recalcitrant 
debtor arises when the repudiation level of utility depends upon the debt 
service obligations that are repudiated. Contracts that satisfy the necessary 
conditions for expected profit maximization in low states may involve positive 
values of x, because the intertemporal marginal .rate of substitution is finite 
for the repudiation level of utility at contracts with zero net outflows (x 
equal to zero). This possibility does not arise if the cost of repudiation 
R. 
l 
-R 0 9, -R 
Figure 3 
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depends only on the current value of output. In this case, the debtor will 
always prefer a contract with zero net outflow to repudiation, regardless of 
the next-period repayment obligation. Therefore, in the lowest state, a net 
payment to the existing creditor is made under debt renegotiation. 
Two properties of the solution to the creditors' two-stage optimization 
problem are notable. The first is that there may be many equilibria; nothing 
in this framework rules them out. Multiple equilibria are likely to occur 
when repudiation costs depend upon current debt service obligations. The 
second is that there is no reason that an ex ante state-contingent contract 
not be written. Such contracts can specify the same equilibrium set of 
contracts as derived in the revision problem. Ex post, the debtor reveals its 
private information by selecting the net payment and contract for the next 
period we characterized above. Because the sovereign debtor always can choose 
to accept none of the contracted payments and next period obligations and 
select a new ex ante contract if utility is higher by doing so, such 
state-contingent contracts will be solutions to an identical two-stage 
problem. The only difference is in interpretation. We have solved the 
problem of contract selection by creditors when the debtor has limited 
liability, and there is always free entry in new debtor-creditor 
relationships. That is, the equilibrium state-contingent contract will assure 
the debtor at least as much utility in the highest state as it attains by 
meeting the current obligation and choosing a new creditor. 
While we have represented the solution as formed by an initial debt 
contract followed by debt renegotiation offers by the current creditor, when 
both sides place positive probabilities on all possible subsequent events, a 
more complex state-contingent contract would suffice. There is no need for 
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renegotiation. If an event occurs upon which one of the parties to the 
contract placed zero probability, however, a contract renegotiation can be 
mutually beneficial. For example, if there is an unanticipated change in the 
world interest rate (creditors' discount rate), the creditor may wish to 
revise the set of ex post contracts offered. If a full state-contingent 
contract binding on the creditor is in force, then only changes favoring the 
debtor can be acceptable. With private information, both the existing 
separating contracts and any new offers can.be selected by the debtor. If, 
instead, the ex ante contract specifies only the loan principal and debt 
service obligation, then the ex post contracts can be offered by the creditor 
after observation of the interest rate shift. The creditors can offer initial 
relationships that specify contracts for each output state in every possible 
realization of the world interest rate. Because the world interest rate is 
public information, such contingent debt contracts can provide welfare gains 
when the creditor is risk neutral and debtor risk averse. If the creditor's 
discount rate is private information (for example, depending upon the 
remainder of its loan portfolio), then debt·contracts with subsequent 
renegotiation possibilities can arise in equilibrium. We can also appeal to 
the costs of writing or resolving disputes over complex state-contingent 
contracts to support the assumption of renegotiation and to rule out interest 
rate contingencies. 
The effects of an interest rate shock (realization of p anticipated with 
zero probability) on the set of ex post separating contracts is ambiguous. An 
increase in creditors' discount rates causes a reduction in the set of ex ante 
contracts. In states for which repayment is preferred to repudiation 
(although the equilibrium debt renegotiation is not necessarily in S), there 
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is a tendency for x. to fall and R. to increase (therefore, utility must 
l. l. 
decrease). For states in which repudiation is superior, however, the change 
in contract is ambiguous. The interest rate increase will lead to a reduction 
in debtor expected utility and a reduction in the present value of the 
contract for the creditor. 
III. Separation through Costly Delay in Bargaining 
The principal-agent framework used in the previous two sections provides 
insight into the nature of debt renegotiation outcomes when borrowers have 
more bargaining power than just the options to return to the loan market or 
repudiate. If we allow output in any given period to be storable for some 
positive length of time (however short, or with arbitrarily large but finite 
rate of depreciation), then the equilibria derived in both the perfect and 
imperfect information cases are equilibria for a strategic bargaining game in 
which the creditor makes all offers (see Sobel and Takahashi (1983)). For a 
strategic bargaining game, with alternating offers, debtors will achieve 
better outcomes ex post than were attained in the preceding solutions. 
exNevertheless, the ex ante contract offers will adjust to account for the 
post divisions of surplus in any subgame perfect equilibrium. 
Bulow and Rogoff (1986) adopt the strategic approach to Nash bargaining 
games under complete information, due to Rubinstein (1982), to sovereign debt 
negotiations. The creditor who acquires the right to impose sanctions by 
making an initial loan sells a promise not to impose sanctions each period to 
the debtor. The amount paid in the subgame perfect equilibrium each period 
for this property right is just the debt service payment. The discounted 
stream of these prices is equal to the amount initially lent under perfect 
'competition among lenders. The perfect equilibrium is.unique if penalization 
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benefits creditors an arbitrarily small amount. The complete information 
model presented earlier in this paper needs minor additional assumptions to 
fit the Rubinstein (1982) framework: let output be storable and let the debtor 
be risk neutral. In this setting, renegotiations will never result in new 
inflows unless a new creditor will also supply them. Under risk aversion, 
access to new credit in the presence of seniority provisions can become the 
object bargained over, but the characterization of renegotiations will not be 
affected. in the complete information bargaining approach, there is no 
particular reason why the initial contract does not simply specify the perfect 
equilibrium debt service payments. If it does, then no bargaining actually 
takes place. 
The asymmetric information model can also be extended to a bargaining 
framework. Delays to agreement can lead to separation of debtors by type in 
an alternating offers bargaining game. Simultaneously offered contracts by 
the creditor no longer serve the purpose of inducing truthful revelation. 
Incomplete information can be introduced, as before, through asymmetric 
observability of output, or through private information about rates of time 
preference. Delaying agreement can arise strategically to separate borrowers 
with different realizations of privately observed random variables, or of 
different social preferences, which are unobserved by creditors. Delay can 
also arise because one or both parties find that waiting for publicly observed 
information to arrive is individually rational. This case may be important 
when creditors, as well as debtors, have limited liability and are therefore 
risk loving. 
This section outlines an approach to modeling socially costly delays to a 
resolution of debt repayment problems. The impasse in the current repayments 
crisis and the consequent lack of funds to finance capital formation have been 
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discussed widely. In noncooperative Nash bargaining models, equilibrium delay 
to agreement has been shown to arise in the presence of incomplete information 
by a large number of authors. We discuss one source of delay: strategic delay 
necessary to convey the debtor's private information. 
Our approach is to adopt the bargaining model with one-sided incomplete 
information of Admati and Perry (1987), which has equilibrium· paths displaying 
strategic delay to external borrowing by a growing economy. Following Bulow 
and Rogoff, we assume that by lending the creditor purchases a right to impose 
sanctions; the promise not to exercise this right is then sold to the debtor 
at the subgame-p-erfect price and time. Unlike their model, agreement need not 
occur immediately here. A major cost of delay to agreement will be the 
absence of new credit. New creditors may not provide additional funds to a 
growing debtor in the presence of unresolved existing claims. The reason is 
that the net inflow of resources will affect the bargaining game between old 
creditors and the debtor and therefore the investment undertaken by the 
borrower. The future flow of output following a given loan will, in general, 
be less if existing claims need to be resolved. 
Several possible approaches can motivate the adoption of the strategic 
delay model. The debtor is assumed to have private information about the 
value it places on avoiding sanctions. Sanctions are assumed to lead to lower 
levels of per capita consumption than are attainable along an equilibrium path 
for the bargaining game, so that debt repudiation will never occur in 
equilibrium. Capital accumulation is possible, and either the labor force 
grows at a constant proportional rate or physical capital depreciates. 
Foreign borrowing can be motivated by assuming that either the planner's 
discount rate or the marginal productivity of capital exceed the world rate of 
interest. A simple model is one in which output, which depreciates in 
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storage, is traded for capital goods which are noncompetitive imports. During 
an impasse, the per capita capital stock declines. 
The private information of the debtor is about the surplus available to 
pay creditors. This can be the current realized value of output in a 
stochastic model, as in previous sections, or it can be the minimum level of 
per capita consumption politically acceptable in a renegotiation; or other 
debtor characteristics. Suppose that whenever per capita consumption falls 
below some level, c, political leadership is replaced immediately (through 
either parliamentary or nondemocratic means). Then the surplus available to 
service debt obligations, that is, the value placed on purchasing the promise 
not to impose sanctions, is the amount of current resources exceeding those 
needed to sustain c along a perfect equilibrium path. The country's 
policymakers are likely to be more informed about c, or, more generally, the 
social cost of generating given levels of trade surpluses (for example, the 
excess burden of indirect taxes). 
We assume that output is produced using capital and labor according to a 
constant returns-to-scale technology. Output is storable (depreciation can 
occur, but need not) and is consumed or traded for investment goods, which are 
not produced at home. Let output be given by 




Storage is given by st' so that 
y t = ct + (-y 5 t-1 - st) - Rt ' 
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where; is the rate of depreciation of stored output and Rt is output 
exported. 
The trade surplus is just 
Rt - i t' 
We ignore sanctions by assuming that repudiations lead to consumption equal to 
or less than the minimum politically acceptable in a negotiated settlement. 
If lenders benefit from imposing sanctions, by any arbitrarily small positive 
amount, then no subgame--perfect equilibrium involves repudiation without 
consequent penalization (see Bulow and Rogoff). We simply assume that 
penalization for repudiation is a credible threat. 
The policymaker's social welfare function is just 
CX) 
t 
U = ~ f3 ct. 
t=O 
The value of the optimal capital accumulation program along a subgame--perfect 
equilibrium path can be defined directly. We first need to note that once the 
debtor's private information is revealed, a complete information bargaining 
subgame follows for the model described here. The creditor's lack of 
information about the value of sanctions to the debtor derives from potential 
differences in the type of debtor, rather than imperfect information about its 
current state. This assumption allows us to look at a single episode, but the 
generalization is a formal exercise. 
The debtor's type is characterized by the maximum surplus it can transfer 
to creditors in exchange for suspension of the threat of sanctions at a given 
time. Time matters both because the social discount rate is positive and the 
per capita capital stock declines during delays to agreement. 
33 
Suppose that the low c type repays at time 0. Then the surplus (denoted 
h
0
) in a given state, k 0 
, is defined by the problem 
V(k0 I h > = 
subject to 
k k + i - nk0 ,1 0 
c f(k ) - (h + i),
0 0 
where V(k ) is the value of the debtor's utility along a subsequent1 
equilibrium path. Let h 0 
be the maximum value of h such that 0 
~ c.c 
We can derive the debtor's value in terms of the amount paid the creditor 
and the time at which settlement takes place by noting that if its type is 
revealed, then subsequent negotiations have the unique complete information 
bargaining solution, so that the value function is well defined. If a pooling 
equilibrium results (which is a possible outcome), then the game repeats. If 
the state variable, kt' is observed by the creditor, however, the type can be 
inferred after one round with a pooling equilibrium outcome. 
For given k0 , de
fine the debtor's value of an agreement as 
S( ht -R, t), for the low c type, and 
S( .R,t -R, t), for the high c type, 
where .R,t < ht for an agreement which transfers an amount Rat time t to 
creditors. S(· ,·) is increasing in the first argument and decreasing in the 
second. The approach of Admati and Perry (1987) can now be applied. 
Suppose at time 0, the lender can make an offer to which the debtor 
replies at time 1. The debtor will never accept an offer that provides less 
value than the value of an offer it can make at time 1 that would be accepted 
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by the lender. The discount factor for the lender is determined by the 
opportunity interest rate. The results of Admati and Perry can be directly 
applied to this model with algebraic modification. The high surplus type can 
refuse a current high offer and wait to receive an offer that the low surplus 
type would accept. In equilibrium, the low surplus debtor cannot offer at 
time 1 an amount which the high surplus type would prefer to wait and offer to 
taking the time 0 offer. The low surplus debtor must wait long enough to make 
a counteroffer to separate itself from the high surplus type when the 
creditor's first (time 0) offer is the equilibrium offer for the high type in 
the complete-information bargaining game. 
Multiple equilibria emerge from this approach. Unique separating 
equilibria exist for large enough creditors' priors that the debtor is of the 
high surplus type. These involve offering the complete information game 
division for the high type at time 0. The low type offers its complete­
information game equilibrium division after a time delay adequate to signal 
its type. Separation becomes costly by reducing the surplus obtained by the 
low value debtor and reducing through delay the available output that may be 
divided. 
If the creditor's prior belief is that there is a low probability that 
the debtor is the high surplus type, both multiple separating and pooling 
equilibria are possible. For low priors, there exists only a unique pooling 
equilibrium in which no delay occurs. This latter equilibrium involves 
lenders offering the complete information equilibrium repayment for the low 
surplus type in time 0. Either type accepts this offer. 
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One consequence of introducing capital stock depreciation as a cost of 
delay is to increase the possibilities for pooling equilibria to arise. 
the high surplus type can, in general, beAnother is that the cost of delay to 
lower than the cost for the low surplus type. Of course, the depreciation of 
the capital stock also increases the effective discount factor for the 
lenders. Resulting separating equilbria may entail even longer delays with . 
capital decumulation when the cost of delay is lower for high surplus types. 
If there are many possible types of debtors (as noted above), a separating 
equilibrium (or mixed pooling and separating equilibrium) must entail a delay 
between counteroffers· made by each possible type of debtor, in declining order 
of surplus. Because this type of delay does not disappear as the length of 
time between possible offers shrinks to zero, significant costly delays to 
agreement can arise. 
IV. Possible Extensions 
Multi-Period Contracting 
In the simple stationary consumption-smoothing model with potential 
repudiation, multi-period debt contracts serve no additional purpose if 
seniority provisions are enforceable. If every creditor claims on an equal 
footing renegotiation proceeds, then multi-period contracts with renegotiation 
may arise in equilibrium. Creditors offering zero-expected profit loans 
recognize that an entrant will offer an additional loan on terms preferred by 
that would not reduce the value of earlier creditors'the debtor to those 
the debtor'sclaims. A two-period contract may be profitable that reduces 
incentive to borrow additional amounts. Such contracts can increase the ex 
ante utility of the debtor in equilibrium by moving the chosen contract away 
from the interest~ate-t:aking one toward the constrained first~est one 
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(Kletzer (1984)). Because renegotiation is possible, such a contract offers 
the debtor an option to choose a particular second-period loan that, in events 
in which it would be taken, new lenders would not offer. 
An example of such contracts is one offering a loan that, taken by 
itself, is expected to be profitable for the first period. A clause is 
included which obligates the lender to provide a new loan during the second 
period, which entrants would not offer if performance criteria are met by the 
debtor. If these covenants are not fulfilled, the lender can choose to 
declare a default and not provide the second loan. A restriction on debt 
this type of contractdilution in the first period is a potential covenant; 
can be self-enforcing for the sovereign debtor. In the case of sovereign 
loans, creditors may be subject to third-party enforcement of their obligation 
if the debtor does not breach the contract, which can specify that disputes be 
brought to the home court of the creditor. The debtor will generally choose 
not to breach the contract through first-period debt dilution. Because the 
debtor can choose to exercise the second-period option or select another debt 
contract in the absence of renegotiation, the debtor's expected utility the 
second period is increased, inducing first-period performance (if output in 
the first-period is private information, then contract breach may occur in 
equilibrium). These two-period loans may provide access to debt contracts in 
the second period that the debtor desires in poor output states over market 
contracts and chooses not to accept in high output states. Because of the 
debtor's limited liability (and consequent market imperfection), these loans 
offer insurance possibilities that a sequence of one-period loans with 
renegotiation do not. In the event of a demanded second-period revision of 
debt service obligations (which may become less probable), the obligations of 
the creditor to supply a second loan can be voided by a contract clause. 
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Therefore, in the event of a renegotiation of debt service, the multi-period 
contracts have no effects. 
The creditor's two-period lending problem is to maximize the expected 
two-period profit with respect to the choice of contract terms while deciding 
whether or not to declare a subsequent default in the event of contract breach 
subject to· a series. of ·constraints. These constraints·. include the debtor's 
choice of accepting the contract over other contracts available and the 
equilibrium choices in each output state at each of the two future dates of 
the debtor. That is, the creditor correctly values the repayment streams 
along each equilibrium path for the subsequent subgames. In the absence of 
creditor observability of the debtor's output, the incentive compatibility 
constraints employed in the previous section are imposed at each date. 
If the opportunity cost to creditors is a random variable, then an 
additional motive arises for multi-period contracts. Since the set of offered 
contracts shrinks with an increase in the world rate of interest, the second­
period loan option will provide desirable insurance opportunities to the 
debtor; if the lenders' opportunity cost of funds falls, then the second­
period (or later) debt contract can be revised. In equilibrium, in these 
events the resulting debt contract will be the debtor's best contract from 
among those offered by other lenders. While risk-neutral lenders will offer 
multi-period contracts providing higher utility to borrowers than equilibrium 
single-period loans, interest rate increases benefit borrowers ex post and 
interest rate declines lead to contract revision ex post. Therefore, the 
length of multi-period contracts in equilibrium is limited by the ex ante 
expected profitability of debtor welfare-improving contracts. Such contracts 
exist at all because the limited liability of debtors leads to equilibrium 
38 
contractual marginal rates of interest exceeding average rates of interest on 
their debts. 
Unobservable Debtor Policy Choices 
The supposition that debtor income is unobservable by creditors may 
strike readers as peculiarly unrealistic. The natural alternative is to 
suppose that income is publicly observable while policy choices by the debtor 
affecting the distribution of income are unobserved by creditors. In a 
stochastic environment, moral hazard in policy selection arises if policies 
enhancing the probability of favorable outcomes for creditors (that is, if 
they raise anticipated debt repayments) are costly to debtors. The choice 
between investment and current consumption is a standard example. 
The first-best contracts for simple principal-agent problems have been 
characterized when output is publicly observable, while the agent's choice of 
an action affecting the distribtuion of output is known only to the agent 
(Holmstrom (1979) and Rogerson (1985)). These contracts specify divisions of 
output as functions of the observable quantity, output alone. In the repeated 
principal-agent problem, the first-best contract depends upon the entire past 
history of output, as well as current output. The extent of risk sharing 
between a risk-neutral principal and risk-averse agent is limited by the 
necessity that the output-contingent contract provide incentives for the agent 
to choose output-increasing actions. 
In the model used in this paper, assume that debtor income is observed by 
lenders, but that the distribution of income realizations depends upon a set 
of current policies selected by the debtor, which cannot be observed directly 
by creditors. Let the distribution of income conditional on policy choice be 
stationary, and assume that current-period felicity depends positively on 
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current consumption and negatively on some measure of policy choice (for 
example, investment). 
Constrained first-best capital flows can be characterized under a number 
of special assumptions for the problem of maximizing debtor utility subject to 
the constraints that repudiation is never chosen in equilibrium, expected 
profits are zero in every period, and the contract is incentive compatible in 
the choice of policy. In a nontrivial step, this problem can be reduced to a 
static maximization problem using Bellman's equation when the incentive 
compatibility constraint can be written as a first-order condition (Spear and 
Srivastava (1987)). The pattern of capital flows between lenders and 
borrowers over time (as a function of the history of income) can be 
characterized if additional assumptions are made about the nature of the 
conditional distribution of income. 
Suppose that the only policy instruments available to the debtor 
government for transferring resources from the private sector to service debt 
create distortions in the domestic economy (for example, commodity taxes). In 
this case, the contracts that satisfy the first-order incentive compatibility 
condition (that is, are locally maximal for lenders) will tend not to lead to 
the optimal pattern of capital flows (constrained by the asymmetry of 
information). In such a model, a serious coordination problem can arise 
between creditors and debtors because complementarities between policy choices 
and external capital flows can arise. Large .net capital outflows may be 
compatible with distortionary policies that reduce the expected return to new 
loans. The possibility that unsatisfactory equilibria arise when the policies 
required to meet large debt service obligations are distortionary can create a 
significant international public policy problem. While the public goods 
.problem of cooperation between lenders suggested by others (for example, Sachs 
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(1984), Krugman (1985, 1987)) may not be severe in light of the possibilities 
for coordination between creditors, a problem of coordination between debtor­
government policy selection and creditor lending choices would tend to be 
particularly difficult to address. 
The derivation of a first-best contract solution for the model with 
privately observed investment levels but publicly observed output is possible 
given strong assumptions. However, the introduction of explicit 
debt-contracts with ex post renegotiation into this framework makes for a very 
difficult theoretical problem. Second-best contracting with renegotiations 
should involve outcomes (new flows of capital) that depend upon the entire 
past history of output. 
V. Conclusions 
The principal-agent framework adopted in this paper has implications for 
evaluating the argument for "defensive" lending to recalcitrant debtors. 
Under perfect information, a debt renegotiation never entails new concurrent 
flows of funds to the debtor and always involves a contract equivalent to a 
debt write-down combined with a new zero--Bxpected profit loan. The 
"rescheduling" of willingly unmet debt service obligations in the form of a 
new loan does not occur in equilibrium in the model of this paper. The 
present value of the option on potential future repayments is less than its 
opportunity cost to the creditor at the margin in the stationary stochastic 
environment. 
In the presence of informational asymmetries, equilibrium for the 
creditor-debtor renegotiation problem is a separating type. In lower output 
states, smaller current payments are made with larger debt service obligations 
· carried forward. A debtor unwilling to mee:t. current debt. service may obtain 
,i 
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new net inflows in a constrained optimal response by creditors only in the 
version of the model in which the penalties for repudiation increase with the 
debt service repudiated. This follows because a debtor may prefer to 
repudiate now with R relatively low to simply consuming current output while 
incurring larger future debt service obligations with the consequent reduction 
in expected utility. 
The separating nature of equilibria derived in the imperfect information 
case may have implications for the evaluation of the (stochastic) debt service 
burden. Subsequent poor output realizations may lead in only a few steps to 
the maximal level of debt service obligations possible with net outflows or 
only minor net inflows of capital along the way. This might be the most 
significant cost of the informational imperfection. Such an expansion of debt 
service burden does not occur in equilibrium under symmetric information. In 
the first model, the debt service obligations have a stationary unconditional 
long-'run distribution; under asymmetric information, they follow a simple 
Markov process instead. 
Our model stands in contrast to an important paper on indeterminacy in 
lending under possible bankruptcy by Hellwig (1977). In that paper, the 
creditor sets a credit limit, which is optimal ex post to relax when it is 
reached by the debtor. If it is not relaxed, bankruptcy occurs automatically 
and the lender receives nothing. Additional loans are expected to be 
profitable because they raise the value of existing loans; no new creditor 
will provide them, but an existing creditor should. This is exactly 
"defensive" lending. However, the interest schedule is given to the creditor, 
and the creditors' policies are restricted to setting limits on the stock of 
debt (so that time inconsistency arises). We have relaxed two constraints 
imposed by Hellwig: default need not be declared following a breach of 
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contract, and the interest charged in a renegotiation of debt is a choice 
variable for the existing creditors. Current lenders have access to a richer 
set of policies. Hellwig uses a hazard process for income, while we adopt a 
stationary one. It is not clear if this is essential. 
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Appendix 
Outline of proof of proposition: 
To show that x. is non-increasing in i, we use the self-selection
.L 
constraint 
U(y. + x.) + ftEV(R.) ~ U(y. + x.) + ftEV(R.) . 
.L .L .L .L J J 
Let i>j, then U(y. + x.)+ftEV(R.) > U(y.+x.) + ftEV(R.). if x. > x., because 
J .L .L .LJ J .L J 
U(c) is strictly concave. This violates the self-selection constraint for 
state j. Therefore, x. ~ x .. Monotonicity of EV(R) in R implies that R. ~ 
.L J .L 
R., again using the state i self-selection constraint. 
J 
V.(x.,R.) = U(y. + x.) + ftEV(R.) is non-decreasing in i by
.L .L .L .L .L .L 
U(y. + x .) + ftEV(R.) ~ U(y. + x .) + ftEV(R .)
.L .L .L .L J J 
> U(y. + x.) + ftEV(R.),
J J J 
since yi > yj" 
The Lagrangian for the creditor's optimization problem is 
n n 
L ~ p. 0' (R.) - i.) + I: I: a .. ( V.(x.,R.) - V.(x.,R.)) 
i=l i i i i=l j'Fi .LJ i i i i J J 
n 
+ ~ 5.(V.(x.,R.) - TT(y.,R))
.L .L .L .L .L
i=l 
n 
+ ~ -y.(V.(x.,R.) - V(y.,R)).
.L .L .L .L .L
i=l 
Necessary conditions for a maximum are 
pi= ((Si+ 'Yi)+~ a .. ) U' (y. + x.) - ~ a .. U' (y. + x.)
.LJ .L .L . . J .L J .L
j'Fi j'F.L 
p.· (di.'/dR.) = ((5. + -y.) + I: (a .. - a .. ))(-ftEV'(R.)) . 
.L .L .L .L .. .LJ J.L .L
J';"f.L 
Because the derivative of i.. with respect to R. may not be well defined for
.L .L 
discrete values of y, (2) should be interpreted as the appropriate weak 
inequalities for right and left derivatives. The function i.'. (R.) can be shown
.L .L 
to be continuous. 
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Following Sappington (1983), a ..= 0 for j>i+l and for j<i-1. Using the 
1.J 
fact that x. < x. if j>i+l, suppose the converse. Then, the i
J 1.+1 
self-selection constraint implies 
U(y. + x.) + fiEV(R.) ~ U(y. + x. ) + fiEV(R. ).
1. J J 1. 1.+1 1.+1 
Concavity of U(c) implies 
U(y. l + x.) + fiEV(R.) > U(y. l + x. ) + fiEV(R. ),1.+ J J 1.+ 1.+1 1.+1 
which contradicts the (i+l) self-selection constraint. A similar argument 
holds for j<i-1. Therefore, only ai i+l' ai i-l can be non-zero for any i. 
Further, note that if a .. > 0, then
1. 1.- 1 
U(y. + x.) + fiEV(R.) = U(y. + x. 1) + fiEV(R1..-l) and1. 1. 1. 1. 1.-
strict concavity of U(c) and x. < x. imply that
1. 1. - 1 
U ( y . l + x . ) + fiEV ( R . ) < U ( y . l + x . l) + fiEV ( R . l) .1.- 1. .l .l- .l- .l-
Therefore, if a .. > 0, a. . = 0, and conversely.
1. .l- 1 1.- 1 .l 
Similarly, for a .. and a. 1.··1. 1.+1 .1+1 
n 
Sis convex, since R + ~ p.(.R,'(R.) - ,Q_) is non-decreasing in R. The 
i=l 1. .1 .1 
following arguments assume that d,Q' /dR. is continuous in R .. 
.l 1. 
Rewriting (1): 
(5 + a l) U' (y + X ) - a l U' (y l + X )n n n- n n n- n n- n 
If 5 > 0, then a must be zero. Otherwise, either 
n n- 1 n 
V (x ,R) < r°(y, R), or 
n n n n 
V 1 (x ,R) < r°(y ,R).n- n n n- 1 
This follows by simply increasing x bye and R by 5 such that expected
n n 
profit remains zero. If 5n_ 1> 0, then an n-l 
0 by the same argument. 
Let k be the minimum value for i such that 5J?0. Note that 5J?0 implies 
that ok+l>0, because ak+l k and ak k+l are both zero. Also, whenever ~.>0,
.1 
V. (x. ,R.) = V(y. ,R) which implies that V(y. ,R)~r°(y. ,R) .
1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 
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In case of equality, 1. + 8. > 0, and with inequality, 8. = 0. We can let 
.L .L .L 
8 .=0 whenever 1.>0. Let i be the maximum value of i such that 1.>0. · 
.L .L .L 
(1) implies: 
p = 8 U' (y + X)n n n n 
Pk+l 8k+1U' (yk+l + xk+l) 
pk (5k + ak k-1) U' (yk + xk) 
pj h. + a. . 1 + a. . ) U' (y. + xj)J J J- J J+1 J 
- a. 1 U' (y. 1 + X .)J- j J- J 
+ x.),- aj+l j U' (yj+l J 
for all j < k, and 
Suppose 1 is zero, then a > 0; using both (1) and (2), this implies that1 1 2 
(i' (Ri) - ii) must increase if (x
1
, R ) is changed so that v (x ,R ) falls1 1 1 1 
until 1 >0. If o1 2 > 0, then the quotient of (1) and (2) for i=2 implies1 
that reduction of (x ,R ) along v constant increases expected profit.
2 2 2 
Therefore, a = 0 and 1 > 0. Note, if i' (R.) has unequal right and left
1 2 1 .L 
derivatives, then ak-l k=0 because Sis convex, but oj j+l need not be zero 
for j;,~k. 
Summing (1) over all z gives 
n n k 
I: l I: 8 .U' (y. + x .) + I: a. . l (U' (y .+x .) -U' (y .+x. ))pi i=k .1 .1 .1 i=2 .1 .1- .1 .1 .1 .1- 1i=l 
k i 
- I: .(U' (y. +x.) - U' (y. 1+x. )) + I: 1- U' (y. + x.).0 i-l .L .L- 1 .L .L- .L- 1 i=l .L L Li=2 
The arguments above can be used to imply that ai-l i 0. Whenever 
(8. 1 + 1- ) > 0, a . . = 0 is possible, but not necessary. If i- i- 1 ii-1 . 
( 8 . + 1 . ) = 0 , then a . . > 0 . 
i- 1 .L- 1 ii-1 
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The above properties can be used recursively to derive values for each 
multiplier. The quotient of (1) and (2) when ai i-l = 0 yields 
di.' (R.)/dR. (-/3EV' (R.))/(U' (y. + x.)),
.l .l .l .l .l 
and if a. . > 0,
.l .l - 1 
di.' (R.)/dR. = -/3EV' (R.) (o. + -y.+ a. . - a. . )




U' (y .+x .)
.l .l 
